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The incentive eﬀects of means tested UK retirement beneﬁts —
has the Pension Credit gone too far?∗
Justin van de Ven†
Abstract
Means testing plays and important role in state provided retirement beneﬁts in the UK. Although
it is well known that the behavioural incentives associated with means testing are theoretically
ambiguous, little work has been conducted to infer the behavioural eﬀects of contemporary means
tested retirement beneﬁts. This study uses a carefully calibrated structural model to explore labour
supply, savings, and welfare eﬀects for UK households of a revenue neutral shift from a state
pension system based on a 40% withdrawal rate — reﬂecting the current policy environment — to
a 70% withdrawal-rate — which is mid-way between the current policy environment, and the 100%
rate that was applied prior to October 2003. The analysis suggests that the policy counterfactual
w o u l dh a v el i t t l ee ﬀect on savings or retirement from a macro perspective, but would have some
important distributional implications. Furthermore, the welfare analysis suggests that it would be
preferable, from a lifetime perspective, to increase the withdrawal rate on means tested retirement
beneﬁts above the 40% rate that is currently applied.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In response to concerns regarding ﬁscal sustainability, countries throughout the developed world have
enacted reforms to their respective public pension systems. One method of enhancing ﬁscal sustain-
ability is to target state provided retirement beneﬁts through the use of pension withdrawal-rates on
private income. In the UK, means testing of public pensions has been a central focus of public de-
bate during recent years, with the government reducing the withdrawal rate on pension beneﬁts from
100 to 40 percent in 2003, and on-going calls by some that means testing should be done away with
altogether.1 In this paper I argue, on the basis of observations drawn from a dynamic programming
model, that pension withdrawal rates were reduced too far in 2003, rather than not far enough. The
analysis reported here suggests that expected lifetime welfare would be improved if the withdrawal rate
on means tested pensions in the UK had been reduced by 30, rather than 60 percent.
Unlike most other countries, means testing has been a prominent feature of the UK pensions system
since retirement beneﬁts were ﬁrst introduction in 1908. In the contemporary context, means tested
retirement beneﬁts were expanded following the election of the Labour government in 1997. At that
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1time, means tested retirement beneﬁts were re-branded as the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG),
and their generosity was increased. Importantly, however, the MIG did not alter the withdrawal rates
applied to means tested beneﬁts, which remained at 100 percent. Between 1997 and 2003, means tested
pensions continued to grow relative to other retirement beneﬁts, until the ﬁxed beneﬁt (the excess
of the Pension Guarantee to the Basic State Pension), was equal to 5.6% of average gross full-time
employment income (£24.65 per week) for a single person, and 7.3% of average employment income
(£32.00 per week) for a couple. In October 2003, a reform was enacted which reduced the withdrawal
rate from 100 to 40 percent, but left the value of the maximum eligible retirement beneﬁt unchanged.
Analysis by Brewer & Emmerson (2003) suggests that a third of all families containing an individual
over age 65 in the UK would have been eligible for means tested beneﬁts prior to this reform, and that
over half were eligible after it.
But is there any reason to expect that a 40 percent withdrawal rate should be preferred to a 100
percent withdrawal rate? And what if the withdrawal rate was reduced by half as much as it was in
2003? It is well recognised that the eﬀects of changing beneﬁts withdrawal rates on aggregate savings
and labour supply behaviour, and the associated ﬁscal burden of the tax and beneﬁts system, are
ambiguous.2 This is because changing withdrawal rates have diﬀerent incentive eﬀects depending upon
where an agent is located in the distribution. In the case of low income households who are subject
to means testing at the margin, a reduction in withdrawal rates tends to improve their incentives to
save (and to work) via the associated substitution eﬀect, and reduce their incentives to save via the
accompanying income eﬀect. Hence, behavioural responses of low income households to a reduction
in the withdrawal rate applied to means tested beneﬁts are ambiguous. In contrast, middle income
households who save just enough to reduce their means tested beneﬁts to zero when subject to a given
withdrawal rate will experience reduced incentives to save due to both income and substitution eﬀects
following a reduction in the withdrawal rate. Identifying the implications for population savings and
the timing of retirement of a reduction withdrawal rates applied to means tested retirement beneﬁts
must consequently be done via observations drawn from either natural experiments, or suitably speciﬁed
simulations. The analysis reported here is based upon the second of these two alternatives.
The focus of this study has important policy implications, at a time when the public debate regarding
pensions policy in the UK is nearing a critical juncture. In 2002 the Pensions Commission was appointed
by the UK government to advise on appropriate pensions policy reform. A key mile-stone of the
contemporary pensions debate was the publication of the Pensions Commission’s ﬁnal report in 2005.
2See, for example, Hubbard et al. (1995) and Meade (1993) who explain the related issues in the context of a simple
two period model. Disney & Smith (2002) make a similar point with respect to earnings tested pensions. See also,
Feldstein (1987) for an early empirical analysis of the incentive eﬀects of means tested pensions, in which pension beneﬁts
are motivated with reference to myopic population subgroups.
2One of the recommendations made by the Pensions Commission is the adoption of a means tested
retirement beneﬁt, with rates and thresholds frozen (in real terms) around values that are currently
applicable under the Pension Credit. In view of the consensus that is beginning to build around the
recommendations made by the Pensions Commission, this implies that a 40 percent withdrawal rate is
likely to continue to apply to personal income in retirement under the UK pensions system, up to the
point where means-tested retirement beneﬁts are exhausted.
Given the theoretical uncertainty that is associated with behavioural responses to means testing
withdrawal rates, and the apparent arbitrariness of the 40 percent withdrawal rate that is currently
applied to UK pension beneﬁts, it is of note that few studies have focused upon the incentive eﬀects of
means tested retirement beneﬁts. This is, in part, because means testing does not feature as a principal
component in every country’s pensions system. In the case of the US, as in most other countries,
greater use is made of earnings tests,a so p p o s e dt omeans tests. The distinction is important, and
motivates the assumed framework of analysis. Whereas earnings tests tax returns to labour — and
have been adopted to encourage exit from the labour market; means tests also tax returns to savings3
— and are designed to limit eligibility to those who lack the capacity to provide for their own needs.
Consideration of the eﬀects of means tested policy consequently requires a focus on forward-looking
behavioural responses, and associated distributional implications. This is distinct from the literature
that considers behavioural responses to pension earnings tests, which focuses upon aggregate labour
supply responses of individuals who are eligible for immediate beneﬁts receipt.4
The analysis reported here is based upon a carefully calibrated structural model of household behav-
iour, in which decisions regarding consumption/savings and labour/leisure are considered to be made
to maximise expected lifetime utility. In making their decisions households are assumed to take into
account the budget constraints to which they are subject, and the processes that describe the intertem-
poral evolution of their circumstances. Importantly, these decisions are made in context of uncertainty
regarding both labour income and time of death. The advantage of this approach is that it makes
explicit assumptions about individual expectations and preferences that are considered important in
determining retirement behaviour, but are unobserved.
The analytical approach that is adopted here is now common with regard to the study of behaviour
around retirement — see, for example, Gustman & Steinmeier (1986), Rust & Phelan (1997), and French
(2005). In the case of French (2005), the parameters of the model were estimated by Method of Simulated
3Although the policy reform that is considered here is described as applying to private income, the associated pension
schemes that apply in practice also included wealth tests.
4For recent examples from this literature, see, for example, Friedberg (2000), Gustman & Steinmeier (2004) and French
(2005) for the US, and Disney & Smith (2002) for the UK. The US pensions system does include a means tested beneﬁt,
called Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In their analysis of this beneﬁt, Neumark & Powers (1998) note that 1.55
million people, or just over 5 percent of the US population over age 64, were in receipt of SSI in 1984. In contrast, the
beneﬁts with which the current are concerned aﬀect a substantial proportion of the UK population.
3Moments (MSM), to match mean assets, average hours of work, mean participation and median assets
described by survey data to the corresponding momen t so ft h es a m ev a r i a b l e si nas i m u l a t e ds a m p l e .
Higher order moments were not considered “because of problems with measurement error” French
(2005), p. 401. A diﬀerent strategy is adopted here for selecting the model parameters, as the paper
focuses upon the distributional consequences of means testing, rather than in population aggregates.
Speciﬁcally, in-sample variation in the real wage, the timing of retirement and consumption changes
around retirement are used to identify unobservable preference parameters via a grid-search procedure.
Elsewhere (Sefton et al. (2006)), an earlier version of the model that is considered here was used
to compare three policy scenarios: one that reﬂected the UK pensions system prior to October 2003
and applied a 100 percent withdrawal rate to means tested pensions, another which reﬂects the current
policy environment and is based upon a withdrawal rate of 40 percent, and a third policy counterfactual
which did away with means testing all together. The head-line ﬁnding of that study was that expected
lifetime utility is higher under the 40 percent withdrawal rate than either of the two alternatives that
were considered. Here I explore whether, in reducing the withdrawal rate from 100 to 40 percent, the
government may have gone too far, by considering the mid-point of 70 percent. In the current context,
I ﬁnd evidence that a higher withdrawal rate than is currently applied would be beneﬁcial from the
perspective of expected lifetime utility.
The intuition behind the behavioural responses and welfare eﬀects with which the current study
is concerned is explained in Section 2 using a simple two period model. The fully articulated model
considered for analysis is described in Section 3, followed by a description of the model’s calibration
in Section 4. Sections describing the articulated model largely restate details that are provided in
Sefton et al. (2006), and the reader that is familiar with that study may omit these without excessive
handicap. In doing so, however, it should be noted that the model used to undertake the current
analysis has been augmented to allow for the accumulation of unsecured debt, and the decision to work
part-time. Analytical results derived from the articulated model are presented and discussed in Section
5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 A Two Period Analysis of Means Tested Retirement Beneﬁts
The ﬁrst period of the two period model corresponds to the working life of a household, and the second
period to retirement. Let w1 denote the total (disposable) resources available to a household at the
beginning of period 1 (full-time labour income plus any physical capital endowment). Wealth at the
beginning of retirement, w2,i st h e nﬁrst period savings plus the return to investment:
w2 =( 1+r)(w1 − e1) ≥ 0
4where r denotes the real (after tax) rate of return to saving, and e1 is total household expenditure in
period one.
In retirement, all households are assumed to receive the universal basic pension, p. In addition there
is a means tested pension beneﬁt, pc, which is withdrawn at the (constant) marginal rate tm with regard
to wealth, w2. Consumption in the second period is consequently equal to:
c2 = p + w2 +m a x ( pc − tmw2,0)
Assume that intertemporal preferences are time separable, and that intratemporal preferences are
smooth and concave in both consumption and leisure in period one, and in consumption in period two.
Furthermore, assume that intratemporal preferences between consumption and leisure in period one
are homothetic and that both choice variables are selected from a continuous, closed and bounded set.
Then the intertemporal utility maximisation problem can be solved by two-stage budgeting, where con-
sumption and leisure in the ﬁrst period are linear functions of total expenditure (for internal solutions).
Quite a lot can be learned about the behavioural and welfare eﬀects of means tested retirement
beneﬁts using this simple analytical framework. To provide more detail, suppose that the two period
utility function, speciﬁed in terms of total expenditure in periods 1 and 2, is deﬁned by:
u =
1
1 − 1
γ
³
e
1−1/γ
1 + δe
1−1/γ
2
´
(1)
where δ is the individual speciﬁc discount rate and γ the intertemporal elasticity of total expenditure.
Given this speciﬁcation, Figure 1 reports the eﬀects on incentives and welfare of an increase in the
pensions withdrawal rate from 40 to 70 percent (with which the current study is concerned).
Panel A of Figure 1 distinguishes between four population subgroups, based upon the resources
held in period one. This panel indicates that reducing the withdrawal rate on means tested retirement
beneﬁts has no aﬀect on the welfare of agents at the extremes of the wealth distribution. At the bottom
of the distribution, agents are unaﬀected by the considered policy change because the pension beneﬁts
are suﬃciently generous (relative to their available resources during the working lifetime) to induce
them to make no private provision for retirement, even when the withdrawal rate is low. In contrast,
at the top of the distribution are agents who save enough to make them ineligible for means tested
beneﬁts under either of the withdrawal rates considered. In between these two extremes, the welfare
cost increases with ﬁrst period wealth to a maximum before falling back away. This proﬁle arises due
to the alternative behavioural responses of two population subgroups, with the distinguishing threshold
between the two deﬁned where the welfare cost of the pension reform is highest.
To understand the determinants of the welfare proﬁle reported in Panel A, note that the income
eﬀect of a rise in the withdrawal rate on means tested pensions tends to increase ﬁrst period savings,
5a n dt h i si so ﬀ-set by the associated price eﬀect. Given the analytical speciﬁcation described above, it
can be shown that a marginal increase in the withdrawal rate on means tested pensions will increase
savings at a suﬃciently high w1 relative to (p + pc), and decrease savings otherwise.5 This is because
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect increases with the amount that an agent chooses to save when subject to the lower
pensions withdrawal rate.
Suppose that means tested pensions are speciﬁed such that the price eﬀect associated with an
increase in the pension withdrawal rate dominates for any agent with an internal solution to the utility
maximisation problem that implies receipt of means tested beneﬁts. Then a utility maximising agent
will only increase their savings in response to an increase in the pension withdrawal rate if they are
made better oﬀ following the policy change by moving oﬀ of means tested beneﬁts entirely. The agent
that is indiﬀerent between receiving and not receiving means tested beneﬁts when subject to the higher
withdrawal rate deﬁnes the transition between those who increase and those who decrease their savings
in response to the policy change.
It can also be shown that — when the price eﬀect dominates as described above — the welfare cost
associated with a marginal increase in the pension withdrawal rate is increasing in ﬁrst period wealth
for any agent with an internal solution that implies receipt of means tested beneﬁts.6 This is reﬂected
in Panel A of Figure 1 by the upward sloping section of the graph denoted for low income agents. In
contrast, the additional utility derived from the provision of the means tested retirement beneﬁtf a l l s
as w1 rises, because savings are increasing in w1. This explains the downward sloping section of the
graph displayed in Panel A for middle income agents.
Panel B of Figure 1 reports budget lines and optimised indiﬀerence curves for low (w1 = w−) and
middle (w1 = w+) income agents to clarify their respective behavioural responses. The line ACDE in
the ﬁgure is the low income agent’s budget line under a withdrawal rate of 40 percent, tm =0 .4.T h e
line ABDE is the low income agent’s budget line under the higher withdrawal rate, tm =0 .7.W h e n
tm =0 .4, the low income agent maximises their welfare at C, in which case they will choose to save
some of their initial resources despite the application of a means test. In contrast, when tm =0 .7,
Figure 1 indicates that the low income household will maximise their welfare at point A,w h e r et h e y
will consume all of their initial resources in the ﬁrst period, and the maximum pension beneﬁti nt h e
second.
The assumptions made regarding preferences imply that the reduced savings of low income agents
in the ﬁrst period will translate into a proportionate increase in both consumption of goods and leisure
during the working lifetime. Thus Figure 1 suggests that a low income agent will choose to save less
5Although trivial to derive, the analytical speciﬁcations are messy, and are consequently reported in Appendix A.
6See Appendix A for analytical details.
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Figure 1: Behavioural and Welfare Eﬀects to an Increase in the Withdrawal Rate on Means Tested
Retirement Beneﬁts from 40 to 70 percent
7and retire earlier in response to the considered increase in the pensions withdrawal rate. Furthermore,
Figure 1 indicates that the aggregate retirement beneﬁt received by low income agents in retirement
may be higher when the withdrawal rate is increased (b>a ). This possibility arises, despite the reduced
generosity of the retirement beneﬁts system, due to the oﬀsetting eﬀect that low income agents’ savings
have on the means tested beneﬁts payable.
With regard to the middle income agent, FHJK is the budget line under tm =0 .4,a n dFGIJK
is the budget line under tm =0 .7. These are to the right of the budget lines of the low income agent
due to the larger ﬁrst period endowment received by the middle income agent (w+ >w −). Under
tm =0 .4, the middle income agent maximises their welfare at H. If the withdrawal rate is increased
to tm =0 .7, however, the middle income agent will achieve its maximum welfare at point I.I n t h i s
case the middle income agent will choose to save and work more when the withdrawal rate on means
tested retirement beneﬁts increases. Furthermore, the beneﬁts receipt of middle income agents under
the higher withdrawal rate is unambiguously reduced, as they choose to move oﬀ means tested beneﬁts
altogether (c>0).
While this two period model provides important intuition behind the behavioural responses that
can be expected for a rise in the withdrawal rate applied to means tested retirement beneﬁts, it does
not permit conclusions to be drawn regarding aggregate eﬀects for a population, as this will depend
crucially upon how the population is distributed along the ﬁrst period wealth distribution. Furthermore,
it does not take into account the inﬂuence on behaviour of uncertainty that is associated with individual
resources (and particularly labour incomes) during the working lifetime. These issues are taken up by
the articulated model described below.
3 The Model
The model considers lifetime consumption and labour supply decisions of households in annual incre-
ments, from age 20 to the maximum potential age of 110. The section begins by deﬁning the assumed
preference relation, before describing the wealth constraint, and the section concludes with an explana-
tion of the approach adopted to solve the lifetime utility maximisation problem.
3.1 The utility function
Expected lifetime utility of household i at age t is described by the time separable function:
Ui,t =
1
(1 − 1/γ)
Et
110 X
j=t
u
µ
ci,j
θi,j
,l i,j
¶1−1/γ
δ
j−tφj−t,t (2)
where γ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (of total expenditure), Et is the expectations
operator, ci,t ∈ R+ is composite nondurable consumption, li,t ∈ {lFT,l PT,1} is the proportion of
8household time spent in leisure, and θi,t ∈ R+ is adult equivalent size based upon the McClements’
scale. The labour supply decision is between three discrete alternatives, in response to the view that
this provides a closer reﬂection of reality than one in which labour supply is a continuous choice variable
for given wage rates. From age 65 (the State Pensionable Age, SPA, of men in the UK), the household
is forced to retire if it has not already done so, in which case li,t =1for all t ≥ tSPA =6 5 .T h e
McClements’ scale depends upon the numbers of adults, na
i,t, and children, nc
i,t in a household, and
its inclusion in the preference relation reﬂects the fact that household size has been found to have an
important inﬂuence on the timing of consumption. To simplify the analysis, household size is assumed
to evolve according to a deterministic age proﬁle. φj−t,t is the probability of living to age j,g i v e n
survival to age t,a n dδ is the discount factor, which is assumed to be the same for all households and
time independent.
A Constant Elasticity of Substitution function was selected for within period utility,
u
µ
ci,j
θi,j
,l i,t
¶
=
Ãµ
ci,j
θi,j
¶(1−1/ε)
+ α1/εl
(1−1/ε)
i,t
! 1
1−1/ε
(3)
where and ε > 0 is the (period speciﬁc) elasticity of substitution between equivalised consumption
ci,t/θi,t and li,t. The constant α > 0 is referred to as the utility price of leisure. This speciﬁcation of
preferences is standard in the associated literature.
The partial diﬀerential of equation (2) with respect to consumption, ci,t, and leisure, li,t,i sg i v e n
by:
Ucl,t =
µ
1
ε
−
1
γ
¶
uc,tul,t
u
1+1/γ
t
δ
j−tφj−t,t (4)
where the standard notation is used to denote partial derivatives. As within period utility and the mar-
ginal utilities of consumption and leisure are all positive, consumption and leisure are direct substitutes
(Ucl < 0) when ε > γ, direct complements (Ucl > 0) when ε < γ, and additively separable when ε = γ.
3.2 The wealth constraint
Equation (2) is considered to be maximised, subject to an age speciﬁc credit constraint imposed on net
worth, wi,t ≥ Dt. Total net worth is deﬁned by:
wi,t =
½
wi,t−1 + τ
¡
li,t−1,r i,t−1wi,t−1 + xi,t−1,n a
i,t−1,n c
i,t−1,t− 1
¢
− ci,t−1 if t ≶ tSPA
(1 − η)
£
wi,t−1 + τ
¡
li,t−1,r i,t−1wi,t−1 + xi,t−1,n a
i,t−1,n c
i,t−1,t− 1
¢
− ci,t−1
¤
if t = tSPA
(5)
where ri,t−1 is the real interest rate, τ(.) is the tax and beneﬁt function, and xi,t is private non-
property income. The interest rate is assumed to diﬀer, depending upon whether wi,t indicates a net
debt; ri,t = rD if wi,t < 0 or rI if wi,t ≥ 0.
During the working lifetime, t<t SPA, xi,t deﬁnes household labour income, equal to ϕ(li,t)hi,t,
where ϕ(li,t) is the proportion of the full-time employment wage earned. This household wage is
9considered to evolve following a stochastic process. At age t = tSPA, a proportion, η,o fh o u s e h o l d
wealth is annuitised at an actuarially fair rate χ. During retirement, xi,t is equal to the annuity
income generated by private pensions7. Private non-property income during the simulated lifetime is
consequently described by:
xi,t =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
ϕ(li,t)hi,t if t<t SPA
ηχ
£
wi,t−1 + τ
¡
li,t−1,r i,twi,t−1 + xi,t−1,n a
i,t−1,n c
i,t−1,t− 1
¢
− ci,t−1
¤
if t = tSPA
xi,t−1
(0.5+0.5(na
i,t−1))
(0.5+0.5(na
i,t−1−1)) if t>t SPA
3.3 The tax function
The function τ is a stylised representation of the UK tax and beneﬁt system, described as a function
of the household’s pre-tax income, that is its property income riwi,t plus non-property income xi,t,
its size na
i,t and nc
i,t, and its age, t. The age dependency assumed for the tax function divides the
lifetime into three periods: the working lifetime t<t IB =5 5 , early retirement tIB ≤ t<t SPA =6 5 ,
and retirement tSPA ≤ t. During the working lifetime, the tax function is speciﬁed to reﬂect proﬁles
reported in the April 2003 edition of the Tax Beneﬁt Model Tables (TBMT) issued by the Department
for Work and Pensions.8 The proﬁles considered take into consideration the impact of income taxes,
National Insurance Contributions, the Child Beneﬁt, the Working Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit.
Although this list omits a great deal of the detail of the UK tax and beneﬁts system, it does include
the principal schemes that aﬀected healthy families with children during 2003.9
The simulated tax function for ages tIB ≤ t<t spa depends upon private income, employment
status, age, and demographic composition. Simulated households that choose to supply labour for
any t, tIB ≤ t<t spa, are treated in the same way as during the working lifetime (described above).
The tax treatment applied to a simulated household that chooses not to supply labour and is aged
tIB ≤ t<t MIG =6 0 , is speciﬁed to reﬂect the Incapacity Beneﬁt and income taxes as they stood in
2003/4; between ages tMIG ≤ t<t spa the tax function is speciﬁed to reﬂect the Pension Guarantee
(identical for the alternative policy counterfactuals considered here) and income taxes.
The speciﬁcation of the tax function during retirement, τ (.), t ≥ tspa, is of particular interest for the
current study. The analysis is based upon two pension beneﬁts, one that is means-tested and another
7The annuity purchased at age tspa i sa s s u m e dt or e d u c et o6 5 %w h e nt h en u m b e ro fa d u l t si nas i m u l a t e dh o u s e h o l d
decreases to 1 in response to the mortality of a spouse. This adjustment to retirement income was necessary to capture
the decline in expenditure with age observed in survey data.
8See http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/tbmt.asp.
9The focus on a single labour supply term for households raises complications for the tax function that is considered
for couples. The UK tax system is based upon individual incomes — a couple cannot split their income to minimise their
aggregate tax burden. The simulation of household income, as opposed to individual speciﬁc income, implies that some
allowance could be made to take into account the tax eﬀect of dual income households. Data from the 2002/03 FRS
indicate that, on average, 80 percent of labour income earned by couples is attributable to the principal bread winner
between ages 20 and 64 (the proportion is slightly lower at 76 percent between 20 and 30, and slightly higher after age
60 at 85 percent). Given this observation, it is assumed that all income is earned by the principal bread winner, and
acknowledge that this will slightly overstate the true tax burden faced by dual income households.
100
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 0
private income (%)
n
e
t
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
(
%
)
single - 40% withdrawal rate single - 70% withdrawal rate
couple - 40% withdrawal rate couple - 70% withdrawal rate
Source: Stylised characterisation of the simulated pension policy counterfactuals
The authors may be contacted for further details
Notes: All monetary ﬁ gures expressed as percentages of median full-time employment income, equal to £369 per week in 2003
Figure 2: Simulated Tax Functions — Retired Households
that is not. All simulated households receive the non means-tested beneﬁt, equal to £77.45 per week
for a single pensioner and £123.80 per week for a pensioner couple. These rates are based upon the
Basic State Pension as it was applied in the UK during 2003/04. On top of this, all households are
considered to be eligible for a means-tested beneﬁt worth £24.65 per week for a single pensioner and
£32.00 per week for a couple. These amounts are based upon the diﬀerence between the Basic State
Pension and the Pension Guarantee that were applied in the UK during 2003. For comparison, the
median earnings of all full-time employees in the UK in the winter of 2003/04 was £369 per week.10
The analysis reported in Section 5 is based upon populations generated under alternative assumptions
regarding the withdrawal rate applied to the means-tested pension beneﬁt. The associated tax functions
are displayed in Figure 2.
3.4 Income dynamics
In the ﬁrst period of the simulated lifetime, age 20, each household is allocated a wage, hi,20,v i aa
random draw from a log-normal distribution, log(hi,20) ∼ N
¡
µ20,σ2
20
¢
. Thereafter, wages are generated
using the stochastic process described by the equation:
loghi,t = β loghi,t−1 + κ
(1 − li,t−1)
(1 − lW)
+ f (t − 1) + ωi,t (6)
10Reported in Table 34 of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) Historical Quarterly Supplement, published by the Oﬃce for
National Statistics.
11where f(t) is an age-dependent wage growth term, β accounts for time persistence in earnings, ωi,t ∼
N
¡
0,σ2
ω
¢
is a household speciﬁc disturbance term, and κ is the return to another year of experience.
This model is closely related to alternatives that have been developed in the literature (see Sefton &
van de Ven (2004) for discussion), and has the practical advantage that it depends only upon variables
from the immediately preceding period (t − 1,h i,t−1,l i,t−1),w h i c hs i m p l i ﬁes the endogenous simulation
of household savings and labour supply. Furthermore, although the concept of an experience term in a
wage regression is not new11, its inclusion is an innovation for the related literature (e.g. Low (2005)
and French (2005)). Most related studies omit an experience term because it complicates the utility
maximisation problem by invalidating two-stage budgeting. We have, however, found that its inclusion
enables us to better capture labour supply at younger ages (see Sefton et al. (2006) for further details).
3.5 Model solution procedure
The assumption of stochastic income implies that an analytical solution to the utility maximisation
problem does not exist. The procedure that is adopted consequently uses backward induction to solve
the required inter-temporal Bellman equation. Starting in the last possible period of the household’s life,
T (= 110 in the simulations), it is straight-forward to solve for the optimising consumption decisions,
given wealth wT and annuity hT (where ht is redeﬁned to denote annuity income for all t ≥ tSPA,
and the household wage otherwise).12 Given this level of consumption we can denote the maximum
achievable utility, the value function, by VT(wT,,h T). This function is calculated at all nodes of a two
dimensional grid in wealth and retirement annuity.
At time T − 1 the problem reduces to solving the Bellman equation:
VT−1(wT−1,h T−1)= m a x
cT−1,lT−1
¡
u(cT−1/θT−1,l T−1)+δφ1,T−1ET−1 (VT(wT,,h T))
¢
(7)
This optimisation problem is solved for each node of the T − 1 value function grid, a process that is
repeated to obtain successive solutions by backward induction. Post mandatory retirement (periods
65 ≤ t ≤ T), this implies searching over feasible consumption choices only. Prior to mandatory retire-
ment (periods 20 ≤ t<65), it is necessary to search over the feasible consumption choices for each
of the three discrete choices of labour supply considered for analysis, and then select the particular
consumption/leisure pair that achieves the maximum utility. Furthermore, during the working lifetime,
future wages are uncertain, and subject to a log-normal distribution. In this case, expectations of next
11With regard to statistical evidence of the eﬀect of experience on income, Mincer & Ofek (1982) report that in the
short run, every year out of the labour market can result in a 3.3%-7% fall in wages relative to those who remain employed.
This study also ﬁnds, however, that the restoration of human capital tends to be faster than the original accumulation,
so that the impact of early labour breaks reduce to 1.3%-1.8% in the long run. Eckstein & Wolpin (1989) do not make a
distinction between the long run and short run impact of actual experience, but ﬁnd that the ﬁrst year out of the labour
market reduces wages by around 2.5%, with subsequent years having a marginally diminishing eﬀect. See also, Waldfogel
(1998) and Myck & Paull (2004) for the role of experience in explaining the gender wage gap.
12The version of the model considered here does not include an explicit bequest motive (though accidental bequests are
generated). Hence, in period T, households choose to consume all remaining resources.
12period’s value function are evaluated using a gaussian quadrature procedure with 5 abscissae points. A
linear interpolation procedure is used to evaluate the value function at points between nodes throughout
the simulated lifetime.13
For the analysis reported in Section 5, the real non-negative domain of both private income and
wealth were divided using log scales, each comprised of 161 points from ages 20 to 64, and 251 points
during each of the periods from age 65. Hence, the entire model involves calculating solutions to
expected lifetime utility maximisation problems at 6,397,381 points for the simulated lifetime.14
Having solved for the household utility maximising behavioural responses as described above, the
life-courses of individual households are simulated by running households forward through the grids.
For example, given a household’s initial wealth and wage (w20, h20) we read oﬀ from the age 20 grid
the household’s optimal choice of consumption and leisure (c20, l20). Then given a random draw from
the distribution ωi,t ∼ N
¡
0,σ2
ω
¢
we use equations (5) and (6) to calculate the household’s wealth and
wage in the next period (w21, h21), a process that is repeated for t =2 1 ,22,...T. A cohort is built up by
repeating this procedure for a sample of households. Our analysis is based on the data generated for this
synthetic population. We now discuss some technical issues that arise in the optimisation procedure.
The value function in this problem is neither smooth, nor concave (though it is increasing and
continuous). This is because the labour supply decision is discrete and the budget set is non-convex
(due to means testing of welfare beneﬁts). Our solution procedure is explicitly designed to identify
local optima that arise as the result of the boundary conditions that are imposed on the problem,
internal solutions that involve equating marginal intertemporal utilities, and internal solutions that
arise due to non-smoothness of the value function. Furthermore, non-concavities of the value function
imply that the optimisation problem (7) can have local maxima, a problem that can be addressed in
a number of alternative ways. French (2005), for example, adopts a brute-force method by searching
across the grid that deﬁnes all possible choice combinations of the assumed control variables. This
is very time consuming, which complicates calibration and associated analysis. We therefore chose to
solve the Euler equations (for consumption), and guard against the selection of a local optimum. This
was relatively straightforward for our decision problem, as we were searching over only one continuous
variable (consumption). The procedure that we adopt is described as follows.
For a given discrete labour supply choice, we searched for a solution to the Euler equation over all
feasible (bounded) consumption choices using the Bus & Dekker (1975) bisection algorithm. Having
found one solution, we searched above and below for an alternative solution.15 If we found one, we
13With regard to computation time, there is a trade-oﬀ between the grid resolution and the order of the interpolation
procedure. As the value function is not globally smooth or concave, greater accuracy was achieved by adopting a ﬁne
grid, and a linear interpolation routine.
14251 x 251 x 46 + 161 x 161 x 3 x 45
15This involved projecting a limited grid about an identiﬁed solution, and evaluating the ﬁrst order condition for the
13searched recursively for any further solutions above and below. This was repeated until all solutions
were found. From these solutions we selected only those that were feasible.16 Of all feasible solutions,
the one that maximised the value function was selected. This procedure was repeated for all possible
discrete labour choices, and the maximum over the labour choices was selected. It is worth noting
that only at a very small proportion of the nodes was more than one solution ever found (because the
non-concavities of the value function associated with our problem were slight).
4M o d e l C a l i b r a t i o n
The parameters of the model described above were adjusted to match the characteristics by age of a
simulated population to those described by household micro-data. Calibration was undertaken using
the following gird-search procedure. First, we normalised by the price of consumption so that wages
and interest rates were speciﬁed in real terms. The real interest rate was ﬁxed at 4% per annum for
non-negative wealth balances and 12.4% per annum for net debt, and wealth at age 20 was set to 0.17
A full-time employed household is considered to allocate 30% of the time available to its adult members
to work, lW =0 .7. A part-time employed household, in contrast is considered to allocate 12.4% of
its time to work, and to receive 28.0% of the full time wage. These diﬀerences between part-time and
full-time employment are speciﬁed to reﬂect averages reported in survey data by the Oﬃce for National
Statistics.18 With regard to the simulations, the punitive nature of part-time relative to full-time
employment implies that part-time employment does not feature very prominently in the analysis.
The credit limit, Dt, that is considered for analysis is speciﬁed to provide maximum ﬂexibility, while
at the same time ensuring that households have no debt from age 65, and omitting the possibility of
numerical errors in the solution procedure. A numerical error will result if a household is required
to consume less than or equal to zero in any period to satisfy the imposed budget constraint. This,
combined with the assumption that all households must have paid oﬀ their debts by retirement (age
65), resulted in the adoption of an age speciﬁc credit limit that is deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h em i n i m u m
disposable income stream that is permissable under the analysis.
In deﬁning the assumed credit limit, we took the lowest potential disposable annual income at any age
(as described by the considered tax and beneﬁts system), deducted a £5 disregard, and calculated the
Euler maximisation problem at each point on the revised grid. If the ﬁrst order condition was found to have the opposite
sign to it’s value at the associated limit (lower bound, for grid points below the identiﬁed solution, and upper bound
otherwise) at any point on the revised grid, then the bisection algorithm was reapplied to solve the associated Euler
conditions for the local maximum.
16This was a check that marginal change in the value function with respect to wealth was locally increasing. Non-
smoothness in the value function implies jumps in marginal rates. The interpolation routines will tend to smooth these
jumps, possibly introducing an infeasible solution to the Euler equation.
17The interest rate assumed for debt is based upon the end of month weighted average interest rates on personal loans
of banks and building Societies reported by the Bank of England (variable IUMPLTL), averaged between January 2000
and August 2005, and discounted by 2% for inﬂation.
18Data derived from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) Historical Quarterly Supplement, Table 38.
14cumulative discounted value to age 65 implied by the assumed interest charge on debt. The resultant
age speciﬁc credit limits are reported in Table 1, and the statistics reported there indicate that the
assumed credit limit is just over £20,000 for much of the working life, rising slightly from age 20 to 55,
before falling away rapidly to retirement. With reference to recent surveys of household indebtedness in
the UK, no more than 2% of households interviewed on behalf of the Bank of England or the Citizens’
Advice Bureaux, and 7% of households interviewed for KPMG, held unsecured debts totalling £20,000
or more.19
Having deﬁned the model parameters described above, we then selected a starting value for each of
the remaining parameters, against which a solution to the lifetime optimisation problem was obtained
following the methods described in Section 3.5. Monte-Carlo methods were used to generate the life-
history for a cohort of households, based upon the behavioural responses described by the model solution,
and the stochastic processes assumed for the intertemporal development of agent speciﬁcs t a t ev a r i a b l e s .
Calibration proceeded by comparing the characteristics by age of the simulated cohort with age proﬁles
that were estimated from survey data.
4.1 The data20
In order to calibrate our model we required age proﬁles of:
1. The proportion of households employed
2. The mean of household non-property disposable income
3. The variance of household non-property disposable income
4. The mean of household consumption
5. The variance of household consumption
6. Household size as measured by the McClements’ scale.
These proﬁles were estimated using the method described by Deaton (1997) from Family Expenditure
Survey (FES) Data covering the period 1971Q1-2001Q1. There appeared to be a discontinuity in the
consumption data after 2001Q1 when the FES was replaced by the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS).
Since the purpose of Deaton’s method is to estimate a supposedly stable underlying age proﬁle from
which cohort and time eﬀects have been removed, and since the discontinuity in the data appeared to
disturb the cohort eﬀects, we thought it best to exclude the more recent data provided by the EFS.
19See the Bank of England (Tudela & Young (2003)), a study commissioned by the CAB (2003), a study by KPMG
(2003), and a study by Kempson (2002).
20I should especially like to thank Martin Weale for estimating the data series against which the model was calibrated.
15We studied the geometric rather than the arithmetic mean of consumption for the reasons given by
Attanasio & Weber (1993) and Deaton (1997) — i.e. that the life-cycle model of consumption explains
the proﬁle of the geometric mean. Given this, and the fact that we relate income to consumption, it
seemed sensible to look also at the geometric mean of income, and to measure the dispersion of the data
by the variances of log income and consumption. We also estimated a proﬁle for the geometric mean
of household size based on McClements’ scale. Since the single composite wealth variable adopted for
the simulation model includes savings that are not reﬂected by the survey data (such as wealth held in
occupational pensions), we have omitted property income from the calibrations.
We ﬁltered the data before estimating the age, cohort and time eﬀects. When looking at income
and consumption we included only those households for which
z =l o g( Consumption) − log(Income);z ∈ (−0.8,+0.8)
We also excluded those households with heads aged 65 or more with labour income of more than £5 per
week in 2003/4 prices and those households with three or more adults. When looking at labour market
participation proﬁles we treated as non-participating those households with labour income below 20%
of median household labour income during the quarter in question.
In estimating the age/time/cohort proﬁl e sw eh a v e ,w i t ho n em a j o rm o d i ﬁcation, followed Deaton’s
approach. We calculated means of the relevant variables by age for the data in each quarter of the FES
and used OLS regression with age, time and cohort dummies to explain the data, the age dummies pro-
viding the required proﬁles. As Deaton discusses, restrictions are required on the explanatory variables
to enable estimation. He suggests restricting the linear trend through the time eﬀects to zero. Instead,
given the substantial evidence that macro-economic time series of log income and log consumption are
I(1) processes (see Nelson & Plosser (1982)), we have chosen to restrict the parameters so that the
mean of the last four time eﬀects is equated to the mean of the ﬁrst four time eﬀects, with the impli-
cation that the time eﬀects embody an I(1) process with zero stochastic trend, but with deterministic
seasonal terms present.21 We ﬁtted proﬁles for the variances as well as the means of consumption and
non-property disposable income. We calibrated the model to the ﬁgures obtained after multiplying the
estimated age proﬁles of equivalised consumption and disposable income by the age proﬁle estimated
for the equivalence scale.
There are a number of complications with the procedure which aﬀect its value as a method for pre-
senting an overall picture of the eﬀects of age on household circumstances. One of the most important of
these is associated with the calibration of household income. When calibrating the model against cross-
21More precisely, in equation (2.89) on p.124 of Deaton (1997), we impose the restrictions that Σ4
t=1ψz,t =
ΣT
t=T−3ψz,t =0where z indicates the variable of concern (consumption, income, etc) and t indexes calendar quar-
ters; this implies that the time dummies are estimated subject to the restriction that the stochastic growth trend is
zero.
16sectional data, it is natural to consider data for the year in which the tax policy under consideration was
applied, which enables simulations to be matched against distributions of both private and disposable
income, and provides a useful validation of the procedures used to model tax and beneﬁts policy. This
is not possible when proﬁles are estimated using Deaton’s method, as the estimated distributions of
private and disposable income are not related by any tax and beneﬁts system that applied at a point in
time, but rather they depend on an average of the transfer systems that were applied during the period
of estimation. Consequently, it was not possible to calibrate both gross labour income and disposable
income in the current context. As savings and labour supply decisions depend crucially upon income
net of tax and beneﬁt payments, the wage generating process was calibrated to match the model against
estimated age proﬁles for disposable household income, subject to the assumed tax system.22
4.2 Calibration of preference parameters
There are four preference parameters to calibrate, γ, ε, δ,a n dα. The parameter pair (γ, δ) tend to
determine household preferences over feasible intertemporal expenditure paths, and the parameter pair
(ε,α) aﬀect preferences over feasible intratemporal consumption/leisure choices.23 For given values of
the elasticity parameters γ and ε,w ec h o s et h ed i s c o u n tr a t e ,δ, to achieve the ‘closest’ match between
the simulated and estimated age proﬁles for mean household consumption; and we chose the parameter
α to match average retirement rates. Eﬀectively this process deﬁnes the parameters (δ,α) as a function
of (γ, ε). Additional criteria were therefore required to select the parameters (γ,ε).
It can be shown (see Sefton et al. (2006)) that increasing ε, decreases the demand for leisure relative
to consumption for high income households (equivalent to later retirement in the fully articulated
model), but has the opposite inﬂuence on low income households. Hence, ε was adjusted to match
the cross-sectional timing of retirement. Furthermore, as noted by Heckman (1974), consumption
will tend to track labour income under the life-cycle hypothesis if leisure and consumption are direct
substitutes in utility. Discussion in Section 3.1 reveals that the value of γ has an important inﬂuence
on the substitutability between consumption and leisure. A smaller value of γ, ceteris paribus, implies
greater substitutability between leisure and consumption, and hence more pronounced income tracking.
We therefore adjusted γ to ﬁt the distribution of consumption about the mandatory retirement age,
when labour changes most substantially. See Sefton et al. (2006) for detailed statistics indicating the
sensitivity of the simulations to alternative assumptions regarding γ and ε.
22A further complication arises if one is concerned about the proﬁle for wealth as well as that for income. The most
comprehensive source of microdata for household wealth in the UK is the British Household Panel Survey, which provides
relevant data for 1995 and 2000. As this survey provides data for only two years, it cannot be used to obtain age proﬁles
using Deaton’s method. Hence, the model was not calibrated to match wealth data in the current context.
23This division does not strictly hold because the experience eﬀect on wages invalidates two-stage budgeting. Never-
theless, it does provide a reasonable approximation, particularly toward the age of retirement, when the experience eﬀect
on wages has a dampened inﬂuence on individual behaviour.
174.3 Calibration of the income process
Three aspects of the wage generating process were subject to detailed calibration: the initial distribution
of wages
¡
µ20,σ2
20
¢
were selected to reﬂect statistics of the distribution for disposable non-property
income at age 20; the experience eﬀect (κ) and the intertemporal persistence term (β) were increased
to motivate higher labour supply by the young; and age speciﬁc dummy variables (one for each year)
and the variance of the household speciﬁc disturbance term
¡
σ2
ω
¢
were adjusted to match the age proﬁle
of the distribution of disposable non-property income to the proﬁles estimated from survey data.
Finally, the model was calibrated for an assumed proportion of annuitised wealth at retirement,
η. This parameter is important in the current context because the proportion of wealth that is not
annuitised is considered to be exempt from means testing. Of the various holdings that are included in
the composite asset, wi,tspa, two principal classes are omitted from the eligibility (income and wealth)
tests that were actually applied by UK means-tested pensions policy: owner occupied housing, and the
ﬁrst £6,000 of additional wealth. In the ﬁrst instance we assume that these exempt assets account for
50% of wi,tspa, η =0 .5.24
4.4 The ﬁt between simulated and estimated age proﬁles
Following an extensive search, the parameter values that were found to obtain the closest approximations
to age proﬁles estimated from survey data are reported in Table 1. The table is divided into two panels.
The top panel reports preference parameters and other exogenously assumed population characteristics,
and the bottom panel provides age speciﬁc dummy variables.
The calibrated parameter combination implies that consumption and leisure are direct substitutes,
and is associated with an average intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption of 0.353, which
lies within the range of values considered by the literature.25 The parameters assumed for the wage
generating process imply strong intertemporal persistence, and a 5% annual wage premium in return for
employment. These statistics reﬂect the diﬃculties that are commonly experienced in capturing labour
participation rates at young ages. The age proﬁles for household size that were estimated from FRS
survey data were exogenously assumed for the model, and are reported in the bottom panel of Table
1. These data reﬂect the standard hump-shaped age proﬁle for household need that has been found
to have an important inﬂuence on the proﬁle for consumption. The survival probabilities assumed for
the analysis are based upon the probability that at least one member of a couple survives from age 20,
and were calculated from statistics reported in the life tables published by the Government Actuary’s
24The assumption of less than full annuitisation and uncertainty with respect to the timing of death, give rise to the
possibility of accidental bequests in the simulations. These bequests are considered to be returned to the government in
t h ef o r mo f1 0 0 %i n h e r i t a n c et a x e s .
25Calculated at population averages for consumption (£386 per week), leisure (0.909), and the equivalence scale (1.837
* 300) between ages 25 and 60, weighting each age equally.
18Department for the UK, averaged over the period 1980 (the earliest year for which GAD projections
were available) to 2002.26
The relation between simulated data obtained using the calibrated parameter values, and the age
proﬁles estimated from survey data are displayed in Figures 3 to 5. All monetary ﬁgures are expressed
as percentages of median full-time employment income, equal to £369 per week in 2003.
Figures 3 to 5 indicate that the simulation model based upon the preferred parameter calibration
does a good job of capturing the age proﬁles estimated from survey data. The top panel of Figure 3
reveals that, although the simulation model under-predicts the proportion employed between ages 23
and 42, the age proﬁle of employment tracks the survey data fairly closely, particularly for the period of
early retirement (from age 55). Furthermore, the bottom panel of Figure 3 suggests that the simulation
model does a reasonable job of capturing the pattern of distribution in retirement, with earlier departure
from the labour force observed at the distributional extremes, and later departure for the 3rd and 4th
quintiles.
Figure 4 reveals a close relationship between the geometric mean of simulated disposable income and
the associated age proﬁle estimated from survey data. However, one of the most conspicuous disparities
between the the analytical model and the age proﬁles estimated from survey data is the degree to
which the analytical model understates the inequality of disposable incomes between ages 20 and 40.
This disparity is attributable to the assumptions made regarding the tax function, the age proﬁle for
household size, and the age proﬁle for geometric mean disposable income. At age 20, for example,
the simulations are based upon an average household size of 1.65 adults and 0.95 children, and the
distribution of wages has been calibrated to match the geometric mean of disposable income to £174
per week (40% of average full-time employment income). In this context, it is of note that the assumed
tax function provides a minimum disposable income of £145 per week to a household based upon the
assumed demographics. The small diﬀerence between this minimum and the associated geometric mean
gives rise to the small measure of inequality obtained for simulated disposable incomes.27 This is a clear
example of the complications that can arise when attempting to calibrate the simulation model to age
proﬁles of statistics that have been independently estimated to control for time and cohort eﬀects.
In terms of consumption, Figure 5 reveals that the simulation model based upon the preferred
parameter combination obtains a close reﬂection of the estimated age proﬁles for both the geometric
mean and variance. The ﬁgure also reveals that the preferred parameter combination obtains a close
26On 31 January 2006, responsibility for the production of national life tables transferred to the Oﬃce
for National Statistics (ONS). Current and historic life tables are still available on the GAD website at:
http://www.gad.gov.uk/Life_Tables/Life_tables_background.htm.
27The small diﬀerence between the minimum income provided by the tax and beneﬁts system and the geometric mean
also implies that there is little beneﬁt to working at early ages. The high rates of employment simulated at young ages
highlight the inﬂuence of the experience eﬀect on labour supply in the current context.
19Table 1: Calibrated Model Parameters
General Model Parameters
intertemporal elasticity (gamma) 0.20    mean log wage at age 20 4.60   
intratemporal elasticity (epsilon) 0.58    sd log wage at age 20 0.40   
utility price of leisure (alpha) 1.65    wage experience effect (kappa) 0.05   
discount rate (delta) 0.97    wage persistence (beta) 0.99   
interest rate on investments (%) 4.00    sd of log wages from age 21 0.18   
interest rate on debt (%) 12.40    full-time employment leisure 0.70   
wealth at age 20 0.00    part-time employment leisure 0.88   
prop of wealth annuitised at age 65 (eta) 0.50    part-time/full-time wage ratio 0.28   
Age Specific Model Parameters
age f(t) eqv scale na nc credit limit age eqv scale na survival rate
20 164.228 1.617 1.647 0.950 - 65 1.201 1.454 0.993
21 205.447 1.670 1.713 0.992 20864.27 66 1.193 1.446 0.992
22 254.346 1.724 1.775 1.051 20867.72 67 1.199 1.456 0.990
23 296.595 1.724 1.774 1.016 20871.59 68 1.183 1.428 0.989
24 330.732 1.753 1.813 1.037 20875.94 69 1.173 1.412 0.986
25 353.322 1.775 1.805 1.122 20880.83 70 1.175 1.413 0.984
26 364.472 1.811 1.818 1.210 20886.32 71 1.171 1.408 0.981
27 367.389 1.841 1.822 1.291 20892.50 72 1.150 1.373 0.977
28 366.227 1.877 1.820 1.389 20899.44 73 1.144 1.364 0.972
29 362.738 1.921 1.824 1.500 20907.24 74 1.133 1.343 0.967
30 356.840 1.958 1.822 1.592 20916.00 75 1.134 1.345 0.961
31 349.934 2.011 1.829 1.713 20925.85 76 1.120 1.319 0.954
32 343.018 2.032 1.809 1.780 20936.91 77 1.109 1.296 0.945
33 335.844 2.081 1.829 1.842 20949.35 78 1.106 1.293 0.935
34 329.658 2.114 1.815 1.918 20963.33 79 1.108 1.292 0.924
35 324.849 2.127 1.798 1.929 20979.04 80 1.096 1.268 0.910
36 320.470 2.153 1.791 1.947 20996.69 81 1.088 1.256 0.895
37 316.301 2.176 1.796 1.961 21016.52 82 1.064 1.215 0.877
38 312.127 2.203 1.793 1.992 21038.82 83 1.062 1.211 0.856
39 307.734 2.197 1.789 1.938 21063.87 84 1.074 1.224 0.833
40 303.221 2.179 1.775 1.857 21092.02 85 1.060 1.192 0.808
41 298.456 2.175 1.771 1.813 21123.66 86 1.050 1.161 0.778
42 293.139 2.152 1.765 1.743 21159.21 87 1.040 1.129 0.748
43 286.914 2.085 1.762 1.556 21199.16 88 1.030 1.097 0.714
44 279.363 2.045 1.739 1.462 21244.06 89 1.020 1.066 0.676
45 270.710 2.007 1.740 1.361 21294.52 90 1.000 1.000 0.642
46 261.036 1.930 1.715 1.207 21351.22 91 1.000 1.000 0.603
47 251.144 1.855 1.693 1.059 21414.94 92 1.000 1.000 0.552
48 241.885 1.791 1.693 0.891 21486.55 93 1.000 1.000 0.502
49 233.121 1.708 1.669 0.727 21567.03 94 1.000 1.000 0.452
50 225.072 1.673 1.677 0.626 21657.46 95 1.000 1.000 0.402
51 217.802 1.581 1.645 0.454 21759.09 96 1.000 1.000 0.347
52 210.305 1.547 1.648 0.373 21873.30 97 1.000 1.000 0.300
53 202.611 1.494 1.631 0.268 22001.65 98 1.000 1.000 0.259
54 195.313 1.459 1.633 0.194 22145.88 99 1.000 1.000 0.211
55 187.727 1.424 1.617 0.133 22307.97 100 1.000 1.000 0.166
56 180.226 1.399 1.619 0.064 21639.92 101 1.000 1.000 0.127
57 172.892 1.373 1.610 0.026 20889.18 102 1.000 1.000 0.095
58 164.405 1.354 1.607 0.000 20045.50 103 1.000 1.000 0.077
59 155.068 1.329 1.595 0.000 19097.40 104 1.000 1.000 0.058
60 146.210 1.294 1.559 0.000 18031.94 105 1.000 1.000 0.043
61 137.412 1.275 1.544 0.000 15214.79 106 1.000 1.000 0.031
62 128.978 1.274 1.540 0.000 12048.92 107 1.000 1.000 0.023
63 121.896 1.255 1.519 0.000 8491.17 108 1.000 1.000 0.012
64 114.787 1.239 1.505 0.000 4493.04 109 1.000 1.000 0.004
110 1.000 1.000 0.000
f(t) = age specific dummy veriables in wage generating process
eqv scale = McClements' equivalence scale by age
na = number of adults in the household
nc = number of children in the household
credit limit = maximum debt households can draw upon
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Figure 3: Timing of Retirement — simulated versus survey data
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Variance of log Disposable Non-Property Income
Notes: Survey data — Estimated age proﬁ les, controlled for time and cohort eﬀ ects
Monetary values reported as proportions of average annual full-time employment income
Figure 4: Disposable Non-Property Income Proﬁles by Age — simulated versus survey data
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Notes: Survey data — Estimated age proﬁ les, controlled for time and cohort eﬀ ects
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Figure 5: Consumption Proﬁles by Age — simulated versus survey data
23match for the reduction observed in both the geometric mean and variance of consumption at retirement.
5R e s u l t s
This section reports the eﬀects of amending the existing UK pensions system to increase the withdrawal
rate on means tested beneﬁts from 40 to 70 percent. The higher of these two withdrawal rates was
selected as the mid-point between the current UK pensions system, and the system that existed prior
to October 2003. The analysis consequently permits an evaluation of the 2003 reform.
The analysis is based upon descriptive statistics for a cohort of 10,000 households that were simulated
by the model described in Section 3. The descriptive statistics are drawn from two simulations, where
the only variable between simulations is the considered policy environment.28 A small open economy
assumption is made so that interest rates and wage rates are unaﬀected by the inﬂuence that the
considered policy change has on population aggregates. Furthermore, marginal tax rates during the
working lifetime are adjusted to ensure that the redistributive systems that are compared have the same
ﬁscal burden, evaluated from the perspective of a cohort’s lifetime.29
Behavioural responses to policy are identiﬁed by comparing the household decisions made under one
policy environment with those made under another. Hence the analysis is concerned with the long-term
eﬀects of policy change, and not with transitional period eﬀects. Summary statistics that describe the
eﬀects of increasing the withdrawal rate on means tested retirement beneﬁts are reported in Table 2.
The ﬁrst impression made by the statistics reported in Table 2, is that the policy change considered
for analysis has a small impact on behaviour and welfare. This is to be expected, given the marginal
nature of the policy reform that is considered here. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a number
of interesting distributional patterns. In this respect the statistics reported for the second and third
population quintiles stand out, as these include households that are closest to the upper threshold for
eligibility to means tested beneﬁts.
The largest statistic reported in the table is the compensating variation from age 65 for the second
population quintile. This statistic indicates that the lower 40 percent withdrawal rate on means tested
retirement beneﬁts is worth just over one third of median annual full-time employment income on
average to households in the second quintile. Households in the second quintile tend to suﬀer most
due to the increase in the pensions withdrawal rate for two reasons. The ﬁrst is due to the reduced
generosity of the pension system when subject to the higher withdrawal rate, which implies that beneﬁts
payable to households in the second quintile would fall in the absence of any behavioural responses (the
wealth eﬀect). The second is that households in the second wealth quintile earn incomes during their
28Note that each simulated household is subject to the same age speciﬁc innovations between alternative policy simu-
lations.
29Marginal tax rates are 0.07% lower when a 70 rather than a 40 percent withdrawal rate is applied.
24Table 2: Predicted Long-Term Eﬀects of Increasing the Withdrawal Rate on Means Tested Pensions
from 40 to 70 percent
Age Group
Full 
Population
lowest 
quintile
2nd 
quintile
3rd quintile
4th 
quintile
highest 
quintile
change in wealth (%*)
20-49 1.10        0.09   0.43   0.96   1.63   2.39  
50-54 5.29        0.19   2.42   6.26   8.70   8.89  
55-59 6.87        -0.20   3.70   11.62   10.88   8.33  
60-64 7.72        -0.41   5.36   19.12   9.58   4.95  
65-79 6.07        -0.13   7.28   18.04   3.69   1.48  
80-110 0.31        0.00   0.38   0.98   0.15   0.06  
lifetime average 2.56        -0.02   2.10   5.66   2.80   2.27  
2001 cross-section 5.08       
change in employment (%**)
20-49 0.00        -0.02   0.00   0.00   0.01   0.00  
50-54 -0.06        -0.17   -0.08   0.04   -0.03   -0.07  
55-59 -0.15        -0.31   -0.50   0.25   -0.03   -0.15  
60-64 0.18        -0.21   0.21   1.48   -0.49   -0.07  
lifetime aggregate -0.01        -0.09   -0.04   0.20   -0.06   -0.03  
2001 cross-section -0.01       
change in consumption (%*)
20-49 0.03        0.05   0.05   0.01   -0.01   0.06  
50-54 -0.08        0.06   -0.07   -0.47   -0.14   0.24  
55-59 -0.07        0.02   -0.14   -0.81   0.34   0.23  
60-64 0.05        -0.09   -0.17   -0.14   0.43   0.22  
65-79 0.11        -0.02   -0.93   0.98   0.35   0.14  
80-110 0.02        0.00   -0.08   0.13   0.03   0.01  
lifetime aggregate 0.03        0.01   -0.19   0.13   0.10   0.09  
2001 cross-section 0.04       
change in tax burden (%*)
20-49 -0.15        -0.06   -0.10   -0.14   -0.17   -0.28  
50-54 -0.22        -0.08   -0.12   -0.09   -0.23   -0.59  
55-59 -0.26        -0.13   -0.23   0.05   -0.14   -0.82  
60-64 -0.12        -0.12   0.08   0.97   -0.69   -0.84  
65-79 0.36        0.00   1.35   0.38   0.06   0.03  
80-110 0.06        0.00   0.19   0.12   0.01   0.00  
lifetime aggregate 0.00***    -0.04   0.24   0.11   -0.10   -0.21  
2001 cross-section -0.02       
compensating variations (%*)
from age 20 -0.12        -0.05   -0.10   -0.12   -0.15   -0.20  
from age 65 7.30        0.12   29.19   7.17   0.00   0.00  
"Lifetime aggregate" and age specific statistics weighted by survival rates 
"2001 cross-section" statistics weighted to reflect census data for UK
population quintiles by wealth at age 64 under the MIG
* percentage of median full-time employment income, equal to £19,188 per year in 2003
** percentage of population subgroup
*** statistic is equal to zero by construction
25working lives that are insuﬃcient to motivate suﬃcient saving to place them beyond the upper bound
on means tested beneﬁts. Hence they suﬀer more than most from the distortionary eﬀects of the higher
eﬀective tax rates associated with the 70 percent withdrawal rate. Households in the second quintile
consequently choose to consume less throughout their simulated lifetimes, and to retire a little earlier
under the higher withdrawal rate on means tested retirement beneﬁts. These responses reﬂect those
identiﬁed for “low income agents” in Section 2.
The third population quintile suﬀers the second largest welfare loss from age 65 following an increase
in the withdrawal rate on means tested pensions. The behavioural responses of households in the third
quintile are, however, quite diﬀer to those of the second quintile. In response to the increased withdrawal
rate, households in the third quintile tend to work longer and consume less during the working lifetime,
to save more for retirement. Indeed they save so much more that their consumption is actually increased
in retirement when subject to the less generous of the two pension systems that are considered here.
These observations reﬂect the inﬂuence that the more pronounced corner solution under the 70 percent
withdrawal rate has on household decisions — the more punitive eﬀective tax rates under the considered
reform drive households in the third quintile, on average, to save suﬃciently to place them beyond
the means tested environment. These responses reﬂect those identiﬁed for “middle income agents” in
Section 2. The fact that their incomes during the working lifetime are suﬃcient to enable them to do
this is responsible for the substantially lower welfare loss that they suﬀer under the reformed pension
system, relative to the second quintile.
The policy reform aﬀects the fourth and ﬁfth population quintiles primarily through the lower
marginal tax rates that are imposed during the working lifetime under the 70 percent withdrawal
rate. As a result, these households tend to consume more throughout their simulated lives. Note,
however, that the compensating variations from age 65 calculated for households in the fourth and ﬁfth
quintiles are zero, reﬂecting the fact that these households save suﬃciently to make them ineligible for
means tested beneﬁts under either of the withdrawal rates considered here (as was the case for “higher
income agents” identiﬁed in Section 2).30 Households in the lowest population quintile (described as
the “poor” in Section 2), by contrast, are not much aﬀe c t e db yt h ew i t h d r a w a lr a t ei m p o s e do nm e a n s
tested retirement beneﬁts, as they tend not to save at all.
The compensating variations reported from age 20 are negative for all of the population quintiles,
indicating that expected lifetime utility is higher when the withdrawal rate applied to means tested
retirement beneﬁts is 70 rather than 40 percent. The disparities between the compensating variations
calculated from ages 20 and 65 are attributable to two factors. Firstly, the compensating variations
30Note that the compensating variations from age 65 are necessarily non-negative, since the pension system is strictly
less generous when based upon a withdrawal rate of 70 rather than 40 percent.
26calculated from age 65 do not take into consideration the diﬀerent marginal tax rates that are applied
by the respective policy counterfactuals during the working lifetime — the less generous pension system
associated with the 70 percent withdrawal rate permits a reduction in taxes during the working lifetime
to maintain ﬁscal balance. Secondly, very little of a household’s lifetime uncertainty is revealed at
age 20, so that a household does not know whether it will enjoy a particularly fortunate working life,
or be subject to adverse circumstances. This uncertainty blurs the distinction between households
identiﬁed in alternative quintiles, in the style of a ‘veil of ignorance’. The statistics reported in Table
2 consequently imply that lifetime welfare would be higher in the UK if the withdrawal rate on means
tested retirement beneﬁts was set at 70 rather than 40 percent.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In October 2003, the UK reduced its withdrawal rate on means tested retirement beneﬁts from 100 to 40
percent. Although the behavioural incentives associated with means testing are theoretically ambiguous
— and depend largely upon how the population is distributed relative to the means tested environment
— little work has been devoted to determining whether, and in what ways, the rates and thresholds now
applied by the UK pensions system are appropriate. This problem is addressed by the current study.
Using an articulated and carefully calibrated model, I consider the eﬀects of repealing half of the
reduction in the withdrawal rate on means tested pensions that was implemented in the UK in 2003.
The analysis reported here suggests that imposing a withdrawal rate of 70 rather than 40 percent
would have little eﬀect on population aggregates. This, however, masks important distributional shifts.
The increase considered for the withdrawal rate on means tested retirement beneﬁts tends to have
a disproportional inﬂuence of households in the second and third population quintiles. In the case of
households in the second quintile, the counterfactual policy reform reduces consumption throughout the
simulated lifetime, and leads to a large welfare cost from age 65. Households in the third quintile, by
contrast, tend to work longer and save more during the working lifetime, to consume more in retirement
under the higher pension withdrawal rate. Although households in the third quintile are also worse oﬀ
under the higher withdrawal rate, they suﬀer a smaller welfare loss than do households in the second
quintile.
The welfare losses suﬀered primarily by households in the second and third wealth quintiles when
subject to the higher pensions withdrawal rate are more than oﬀset by the reduced marginal tax rates
that are made possible during the working lifetime, and by the uncertainty that is associated with
labour income, so that a negative compensating variation from age 20 is observed for all population
quintiles. Hence, the analysis suggests that, from a lifetime perspective, it might be preferable to apply
a higher withdrawal rate to means tested retirement beneﬁts than is currently the case — the 60 percent
27fall in the withdrawal rate implemented in October 2003 might have gone too far.
The analysis presented here, and in our related study (Sefton et al. (2006)) naturally gives rise to
the question: Is there an “optimal” withdrawal rate for means tested pensions in the UK? Obtaining
an answer to this question is the subject of ongoing research.
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A Analytical Derivations for the Two Period Model
Problem:
max
e1,e2
U (e1,e 2)=
1
1 − 1/γ
³
e
1−1/γ
1 + δe
1−1/γ
2
´
(8a)
subject to e1,e 2 ≥ 0
e1 ≤ w1
e2 ≤ p + w2 +m a x( 0 ,p c − tmw2),w h e r ew2 =( 1+r)(w1 − e1)
(8b)
and where all variables are as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 .L e tˆ ei denote the utility maximising total expenditure
in period i. Then, interior solutions for households in receipt of means tested retirement beneﬁts are
deﬁned by:
ˆ e1 =
(p + pc)+( 1+r)(1− tm)w1
(1 + r)(1− tm)+[ δ(1 + r)(1− tm)]
γ (9)
The eﬀect of the pension withdrawal rate on saving of agents in receipt of means tested
beneﬁts
For agents in receipt of means tested beneﬁts, a marginal change of the withdrawal rate aﬀects ﬁrst
period saving, w2, as described by:
dw2
dtm
= Aw1 − B (p + pc) (10)
A =
δ
γ (1 + r)
γ−1 (γ − 1)(1 − tm)
γ−2
1+δ
γ [(1 + r)(1− tm)]
γ−1
⎛
⎜
⎝
δ
γ [(1 + r)(1− tm)]
γ−1
n
1+δ
γ [(1 + r)(1− tm)]
γ−1o2 − 1
⎞
⎟
⎠ (11)
B =
(1 + r)+δ
γ (1 + r)
γ γ (1 − tm)
γ−1
{(1 + r)(1− tm)+[ δ (1 + r)(1− tm)]
γ}
2 (12)
If γ < 1 (as is usually the case for the intertemporal elasticity), then A>0 and B>0,s ot h a t
dw2/dtm > 0 if w1 is suﬃciently larger relative to (p + pc),a n dv i c ev e r s a .
The eﬀect of the pension withdrawal rate on welfare of agents in receipt of means tested
beneﬁts
For agents in receipt of means tested beneﬁts and some savings, a marginal increase of the withdrawal
rate will necessarily reduce lifetime utility.31 The way in which this reduction varies with ﬁrst period
31This is because the revised budget constraint will be strictly dominated by the original budget constraint, and agents
in receipt of means tested beneﬁts and some savings will no longer be able to aﬀord their original utility maximising
consumption bundle.
30wealth is described by:
d2V
dtmdw1
= −
1
γ
ˆ e
− 1
γ −1
1
dˆ e1
dtm
(13)
where V = U (ˆ e1, ˆ e2) denotes utility at the optimum. Since ˆ e1,γ ≥ 0 by assumption, and dˆ e1/dtm > 0 if
the price eﬀect dominates (as described in the preceding subsection), then d2V/(dtmdw1) < 0. Hence,
the fall in utility associated with a marginal increase in the pensions withdrawal rate is larger as w1
increases.
31